Identity relations are at the foundation of many logic-based knowledge representations. We argue that the traditional notion of equality, is unsuited for many realistic knowledge representation settings. The classical interpretation of equality is too strong when the equality statements are re-used outside their original context. On the Semantic Web, equality statements are used to interlink multiple descriptions of the same object, using owl:sameAs assertions. And indeed, many practical uses of owl:sameAs are known to violate the formal Leibniz-style semantics. We provide a more flexible semantics to identity by assigning meaning to the subrelations of an identity relation in terms of the predicates that are used in a knowledge-base. Using those indiscernability-predicates, we define upper and lower approximations of equality in the style of rought-set theory, resulting in a quality-measure for identity relations.

Plan recognition does not work the same way in stories and in "real life" (people tend to jump to conclusions more in stories). We present a theory of this, for the particular case of how objects in stories (or in life) influence plan recognition decisions. We provide a Bayesian network formalization of a simple first-order theory of plans, and show how a particular network parameter seems to govern the difference between "life-like" and "story-like" response. We then show why this parameter would be influenced (in the desired way) by a model of speaker (or author) topic selection which assumes that facts in stories are typically "relevant".